Dr. Karim El Mufti
Enseignant-chercheur en science politique
La disproportion de la réaction de militants sunnites suite au « crime » commis contre plusieurs ulémas de Dar El Fatwa, la haute instance sunnite du Liban, physiquement agressés dans des quartiers à majorité chiite le 17 mars 2013, est illustrative de la tendance des communautés libanaises au renfermement. Malgré l’appel au calme et à la retenue lancé par les différentes figures politico-communautaires, une étape supplémentaire fut de nouveau franchie en matière de tension intercommunautaire, notamment entre les groupes sunnite et chiite, emblématique d’une poussée régionale dans cette direction sous l’ère contemporaine.
Pays du « fédéralisme intégré » théorisé par Antoine Messarra[1], le Liban offre aux différents segments communautaires une très large autonomie sociale, économique, religieuse et évidemment politique inscrite dans le marbre de la Constitution. Cette autonomie rappelle pour l’auteur une forme de fédéralisme, intégré dans un Etat à caractère unitaire, à savoir qu’en lieu d’une répartition géographique et territoriale (comme les cantons suisses ou les fédéralismes classiques), les groupes confessionnels au Liban sont organisés selon une législation régissant une adhésion à un statut personnel. Ainsi, chacune des communautés reconnues se retrouve avec un nombre de 167 compétences constituant son statut personnel et celui-ci varie selon les communautés. Cette institutionnalisation du communautarisme fut confirmée par les accords de Taëf de 1989 malgré la mention d’une hypothétique « abolition du confessionnalisme politique »[2] qui ne trouvera jamais de relais politique pour une éventuelle mise en œuvre, car délaissée par des formations politico-communautaires arc-boutées sur des valeurs étroitement sectaires.
Pourtant, lors de l’expulsion de l’acteur syrien de l’espace politique libanais en avril 2005 provoquée par l’onde de choc de l’assassinat de l’ancien premier ministre Rafic Hariri, les tenants d’une renaissance de la république libanaise ont acclamé la venue d’une « seconde indépendance » (théorisée par le courant du 14 Mars) ainsi que le renouveau d’un « mouvement souverainiste » (théorisé par le courant du 8 Mars, notamment le Courant Patriotique Libre de Michel Aoun rentré d’exil en mai 2005). Premier chef du gouvernement de l’ère post-syrienne, Fouad Siniora affirmait avec confiance au sujet de la déclaration de principes de politique générale de son cabinet nouvellement formé que c’est « la première fois que nous [la] rédigeons nous-mêmes »[3], en référence aux incessantes ingérences du grand frère syrien depuis le quartier général de Anjar dans la Békaa.
En moins d’une décennie, ces espoirs ont fait long feu, accélérant une tendance vers le délitement du visage républicain au Liban sous le poids croissant de l’envahissement du champ politique libanais par des revendications communautaristes toujours plus pressentes.
1. Le lent délitement de la République
Pionnier dans l’application d’une ingénierie politique favorisant le partage du pouvoir, ou consociationnalisme, théorisé par Arendt Lijphart[4], le Liban sut très tôt intégrer le caractère pluriel de son tissu social dans son système politique en vue de garantir à l’ensemble des minorités un certain poids au sein des institutions étatiques, comme inscrit dès la première Constitution libanaise de 1926[5]. En dépit de la division de la littérature des sciences sociales autour de la question de savoir si le consociationnalisme est bénéfique en terme de facteur de stabilité politique, force reste tout de même de constater qu’il figure parmi les grands acquis du régime politique libanais d’après-guerre[6], lequel ne fut pas remis en question même après le retrait du protagoniste syrien en avril 2005.
Néanmoins, les politiques libanais ne purent jamais sortir le pays du sous-développement politique chronique[7] maintenant la République libanaise dans une « phase de pré-Etat » pour reprendre une expression de Farid El Khazen[8] lequel entend par là un phénomène de sous-institutionnalisation de l’entité étatique. Celle-ci prend par conséquent la forme, comme le dit Jean Leca, d’« un collectif non institué […] perçu comme un faisceau ou un fagot d’institutions, d’organisations et d’agents, [plutôt] que comme une institution »[9]. La multiplication des incidents entre des hauts fonctionnaires et leurs ministres respectifs[10] vient à cet égard confirmer la nature compartimentée de l’administration publique, déchirée entre les différentes loyautés politico-communautaires et incapable de tenir son rôle dans la reconstruction de l’édifice républicain.
Par ailleurs, l’effacement de la notion de république et la défense du constitutionnalisme se fait de plus en plus notable dans les discours et les actes politiques des différentes formations libanaises. Jadis en marge du discours politique local, les options centrifuges, parmi lesquelles le principe fédéral, furent en effet écartées lors de la proclamation de la seconde République et le retour de la « légalité » (à savoir les institutions étatiques) au sortir de la guerre, malgré le fait qu’elles furent agressivement poursuivies durant celle-ci.
Ainsi, le courant porteur du fédéralisme libanais, largement influencé par, entre autres, Antoine Najm[11], finit par séduire de nombreux intellectuels au sein des cercles politiques libanais. Parmi les nouveaux supporters de cette vision, le parti Kataëb s’est rallié à cette tendance. Présidé par l’ancien président de la République Amine Gemayel qui pourtant débuta son mandat en 1982 très marqué par des positions nationalistes et arabistes, ce dernier écrit aujourd’hui que « dans un Etat pluriel comme le Liban, il est indispensable de créer de petites entités régionales de manière à mieux responsabiliser le citoyen, à mieux le faire participer aux différents volets de la vie publique et lui permettre de mieux s’épanouir par la réalisation de ses aspirations légitimes dans son environnement sociocommunautaire »[12]. Cette profonde évolution fut en partie influencée par les positions du cadet de la famille, Sami Gemayel, avant sa réconciliation avec le parti fondé par son grand-père. Ainsi, le fils de l’ancien président épousa la défense de l’option fédérale au travers du regroupement Loubnanouna [Notre Liban][13] s’appuyant sur le principe selon lequel « le Liban est un Etat de Nations et non un Etat-Nation, comment vivre dans un pays où l'existence même des multiples communautés qui le composent est chaque jour remise en cause ? »[14]. En outre, on retrouve la formule fédérale ouvertement prônée parmi d’autres courants politiques, opérant par la même occasion un véritable travail de déminage autour de cette notion selon le principe suivant : « qui dit fédéralisme ne dit pas partition du Liban »[15].
Sans être aussi directement formulés, les schémas de pensée des leaders politiques des autres communautés s’avancent lentement vers l’idée d’une nécessité de faire évoluer le système politique afin que chacune des sectes puisse mettre en œuvre son « projet de société » (voir point 2). Comme l’avance Alain Dieckhoff, cette notion implique la création à terme d’« entités fédérées ayant un projet de société spécifique à défendre, [et leur donner] des droits et des pouvoirs dont ne jouiraient pas les autres entités purement territoriales et administratives »[16].
Le fédéralisme perd ainsi progressivement son caractère tabou par le renforcement des mobilisations communautaristes d’un côté, mais également par le fait de l’effritement des contre-pouvoirs encadrant traditionnellement le communautarisme libanais tel que fonctionnant au Liban.
2. Effritement des contre-pouvoirs au communautarisme politique
Un premier verrou s’est vu décrocher devant la doctrine communautariste traçant aussi inexorablement son chemin, celui de la présidence de la République qui a vécu une rétrogradation politique au profit d’une militarisation du poste suprême de l’Etat libanais. Si la présence d’un militaire au sommet de l’Etat n’est pas sans précédent dans l’histoire politique libanaise comme l’indique le mandat du père de l’administration publique libanaise, le général Fouad Chehab (1958-1964), force est de constater que la défense de l’idée républicaine ne fut pas le fort des généraux de l’époque contemporaine. En effet, qu’il s’agisse du président-général Emile Lahoud (1998-2007), obsédé par la sauvegarde des intérêts syriens au Liban ou du président-général Michel Sleiman (depuis 2008) relégué au rang d’observateur impuissant devant le renforcement des mobilisations communautaristes, la stature du chef de l’Etat, traditionnel emblème de la « légalité » face au communautarisme, a désormais perdu son rôle de balancier aux forces centrifuges des formations politico-communautaires.
Par ailleurs, il s’agit de relever l’effacement progressif des lignes et des discours laïques des grands courants politiques au Liban. Qu’il s’agisse du parti Amal dont le président représente l’instance législative du pays, mais luttant surtout pour maintenir sa position de second représentant de la population chiite aux côtés du Hezbollah, du PSP de Walid Joumblatt qui s’est brusquement rabattu sur la seule défense des intérêts purement druzes ou du Courant du Futur autrefois marqué par une ambition transcommunautaire et qui lutte désormais pour une monopolisation de la représentation de l’électorat sunnite en fustigeant le « mini-Etat du Hezbollah [chiite] »[17], il s’agit là d’un ralliement des grandes figures aux rangs des porte-voix des crispations des identités communautaires transposées dans le champ politique, s’alignant ainsi sur les discours, traditionnels et plus récents, des principaux courants politiques chrétiens libanais. Parmi ceux-là, Michel Aoun, le président du CPL veut remédier au « hold-up commis contre le droit des chrétiens »[18], en partie causé par « la fin de la dualité des leaderships au sein des communautés au Liban et l’émergence de blocs sunnite, chiite et druze homogènes »[19].
Ajoutons à cela la disparition, physique cette fois, des figures intellectuelles emblématiques de la recherche d’une laïcité (certains diraient étatisme civil) à la libanaise (sur les flancs aussi bien de gauche que de droite) comme Samir Kassir ou Gebrane Tuéni [20], conduisant à un affaissement supplémentaire des remparts contre la mainmise du tout-communautaire dans l’espace sociopolitique libanais. Ceux-ci se retrouvent aujourd’hui dans un état de délabrement avancé, ouvrant la voie à une inexorable marche de l’entité libanaise du 21ème siècle vers davantage de solutions empruntées à un idéal fédéral.
L’aboutissement de ce phénomène a conduit à un puissant effet de cliquet qui vit l’émergence dans le paysage législatif au Liban d’un très sérieux débat sur une loi électorale basée sur un vote exclusivement communautaire tel que préconisé par le projet de loi promu par l’ancien ministre Elie Ferzli (popularisé sous l’appellation de projet de loi orthodoxe en rapport avec la communauté d’origine dudit ministre).
Quoique nécessitant un amendement constitutionnel pour pouvoir passer en l’état, ce développement évoque néanmoins la concrétisation d’une tendance lourde vers de nouvelles caractéristiques du communautarisme politique proprement libanais. Si celles-ci sont décriées par les marges de la population rangée au cosmopolitisme ou à la gauche farouchement anti-communautariste, cette formule n’en reste pas moins en phase avec l’ancrage des mentalités sociales et politiques de la société plurielle et mosaïque que constitue le Liban aujourd’hui.
Beyrouth, le 20 mars 2013
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[1] MESSARRA, Antoine. Théorie générale du système politique libanais, Cariscript, Paris, 1994.
[2] Point G de l’Accord de Taëf du 22 octobre 1989.
[3] An Nahar du 5 octobre 2005.
[4] LIJPHART, Arend. Democracy in plural societies. A comparative exploration, New Haven, Yale university press, 1977, LIJPHART, Arend. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1984, LIJPHART, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999.
[5] L’article 95 de la Constitution de 1926 disposait originellement : « A titre transitoire et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 1er de la Charte du Mandat et dans une intention de justice et de concorde, les communautés seront équitablement représentées dans les emplois publics et dans la composition du ministère sans que cela puisse cependant nuire au bien de l'État ». La loi constitutionnelle de 1990 amenda l’article sans en modifier le fond : « A titre transitoire et dans une intention de justice et de concorde, les communautés seront équitablement représentées dans les emplois publics et dans la composition du ministère sans que cela puisse cependant nuire au bien de l'État ».
[6] Lire entre autres: PICARD, Elizabeth. Les habits neufs du communautarisme libanais. Cultures et Conflits, n°15/16, automne-hiver 1994, p. 49. Disponible sur Internet : http://www.conflits.org/index515.html
[7] Sur la notion de sous-développement politique, lire HUDSON, Michael. A Case of Political Underdevelopment. Journal of Politics, vol. 29, n°4, Nov. 1967, pp. 821-837.
[8] EL KHAZEN, Farid. L’Etat au Liban: qui en veut vraiment? In Réinventer le Liban, Supplément de l’Orient-Le Jour, Beyrouth, mars 2008, p. 94.
[9] LECA, Jean. Violence et ordre. In HANNOYER Jean (dir.) Guerres Civiles, économies de la violence, dimensions de la civilité, Karthala, 1999, p. 317-318.
[10] Citons à titre de rappel le déclenchement des clashs de mai 2008 en partie à cause de la destitution du directeur de la Sûreté Générale, ou plus récemment encore l’affaire Ogero de mai 2011 ou celle des données des centrales de télécommunications de janvier 2012 qui ont provoqué une crise interministérielle.
[11] Lire à ce sujet NAJM, Antoine. El Ta’ifiya El Siyasiya wa Machrou’iyatiha [Le Confessionnalisme politique et sa légitimité], 1er février 2010, NAJM, Antoine. Le Fédéralisme, point de départ de la solution. In Réinventer le Liban, Supplément de l’Orient-Le Jour, Beyrouth, mars 2008, pp. 126-127.
[12] GEMAYEL, Amine. Le Liban, un projet d’espoir! In Réinventer le Liban, Supplément de l’Orient-Le Jour, Beyrouth, mars 2008, p. 53.
[13] Cercle de réflexion politique nostalgique de feu le Président Bachir Gemayel, et fondé par de jeunes politiciens, dont Sami Gemayel dont le but est la promotion de la solution fédérale au Liban, cf http://www.loubnanouna.org
[14] Note publiée sur le site www.loubanouna.org, le 8 décembre 2005.
[15] BOU NASSIF, Hisham. Pour un Etat fédéral. Conférence à la Maison de l’Avocat dans le cadre d’un cycle de reflexion sur l’avenir politique du Liban, 9 avril 2008, compte-rendu publié sur le site des Forces Libanaises sur http://www.lebanese-forces.com/2008/04/14/8391
[16] DIECKHOFF, Alain. La nation dans tous ses Etats, les identités nationales en mouvement, Flammarion, Paris, 2000, p. 233.
[17] Discours de Saad Hariri, chef du Courant du Futur, le 14 février 2013 lors de la 8ème commémoration de l’assassinat de son père Rafic Hariri.
[18] Interview de Michel Aoun dans Al Akhbar du 15 février 2013.
[19] Idem
[20] Tous deux assassinés par des attentats à la bombe le premier le 2 juin 2005 et le second le 12 décembre 2005.
The Beirut Enterprise represents a precious Agora to freely study and publish my works on political science, human rights, international justice and public policies, with a particular focus on the Levant region. The Beirut Enterprise believes in an academic and non partisan approach to understand and analyze regional and international geopolitics, along with political economics and policy insights.
Tumultuous Lebanon, Where the Intelligence War Never Pauses
Dr. Karim
El Mufti
University
Professor
Political
Scientist
It took longer than usual compared
with other political assassinations (given the high secrecy linked to security
related areas), but the information eventually came out, the head of the
Intelligence Branch of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), Brigadier Wissam El
Hassan, was targeted and terminated.
1. The political war and Syria
Minutes into the Ashrafieh blast and
14 March local figures were already trying to make political good fortune out
of the tragedy, raising the scenario of an alleged targeting of the Kataeb
House, or the 14 March General Secretariat office, or even how Syria the
terrorist “targeted the heart of a Lebanese Christian area”. The context changed
once the announcement broke of the direct plot against the ISF Brigadier, even
though the accused party remained the same: Syria had killed Al Hassan in “retaliation of the arrest of Michel Samaha”,
the close advisor of Bashar Al Assad ; he was targeted because of the “efforts made by the ISF to stop Syrian
infiltrations into Lebanon”.
Blaming directly the Syrian regime for
the terrorist blast, self-exiled Saad Hariri was, from day one, trying to use the
killing as a high horse to make a comeback onto the Lebanese political
landscape after a period of political numbness: “if I were prime minister, my actions would be to stand against Bachar
el Assad and say very clearly that anything that will come into Lebanon, if the
regime is trying to export its terrorists to Lebanon, we would definitely
refuse it”[1].
Other spokespersons from the 14
March coalition carried on with the interpretation that this attack was an
export of the Syrian conflict into the heart of the Lebanese capital. As
clearly put by Kataeb president and anti-Syrian figure, Amine El Gemayel, to
the LBC television :
“This regime, which is crumbling, is
trying to export its conflict to Lebanon”.
But this explanation falls short
when, at the same time, the same anti-Syrian coalition eagerly connected the
attack (due to “troubling similarities”)
with past attacks on anti-Syrian figures (Gebran Tueni or Antoine Ghanem for
instance), at a time when “Syria al Assad” was well up on its feet, way before
the civil war there.
Still, there is no doubt in the
extensiveness of the blow the anti-Syrian coalition 14 March has just received
with the decapitation of the head of a security service loyal to its agenda.
Along with other public administrations, like the Council for Reconstruction
and Development and Ogero within the Telecommunications Ministry, this ISF
branch represented little of what was left of the opposition’s influence within
State institutions, remotely led by Saad Hariri since he was removed from power
in January of last year. Given the sensitive and strategic nature of the
Information Branch within the ISF, needless to say how enduring the hit came to
the political leverage of the 14 March coalition.
2. The evidence war and the STL
Wissam Al Hassan was not only a top security
operative who made possible the dismantlement of pro-Israeli cells, or the
arrest of former Minister Michel Samaha last August for planning to carry out
terrorist attacks on Lebanese soil, he was most importantly in charge of the
Lebanese side of the investigation of Rafic Hariri’s assassination. Brigadier Al
Hassan was hence among the people the prosecutor at the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (STL) could count on in order to build his case. In that, the
indictment against the four members of Hezbollah is based, in the prosecutor’s
own words, on “circumstantial evidence”[2]
related to a series of interconnected telecommunications cells that were operating
in preparation to the attack, and that were allegedly set up by the four
suspects yet to be arrested.
With the overturn of the political
equilibrium and the formation of the 8 March pro-Syrian government, which is
hostile to the STL work, the intelligence unit run by Brigadier Al Hassan had
the mission of keeping the cooperation with the STL’s prosecutor alive. It is
important to highlight that the ISF Information Branch is the unit that uncovered the
telecommunications cells’ matrix (with the support of another police martyr and
IT expert, Captain Wissam Eid, assassinated in January 2008), before linking it
to Hezbollah members, and then possibly leaking the information to Der Spiegel who suggested this
eventuality in May 2009, two years before the indictment was issued. Since
that time, a crucial target shift has taken place, passing from the suspicion
of an official Syrian involvement to a Lebanese (Hezbollah) involvement in the
assassination of Rafic Hariri.
As such, anti-Hezbollah formations
in Lebanon had high hopes in the work of the ISF intelligence branch as it was fuelling,
genuinely or not, the accusation party, despite the loss of control over the
government. Whether these pieces of evidence were authentic or not was never really
the primary concern of the 14 March coalition. Some opposition figures, like
Samir Geagea, chose to entirely endorse the views of the prosecutor as
to the involvement of Hezbollah suspects[3],
even before the pre-trial Judge had set a trial date, whereas Hezbollah officials regularly rejected the telecommunications related evidence considering it fabricated.
This evidence war, that will contribute to determine the fate and outcome of the coming trial, has put Brigadier Wissam El
Hassan at the centre of a vast intelligence (national, regional and international) confrontation, as he fell victim of
irreconcilable conflicting interests where the battles behind the scenes never pause.
3. The 14 March window of opportunity to regain political ground
For the opposition group, the killing of Al Hassan has hence taken away a strong Lebanese ally in the investigation team
that would have been keen on beefing up the accusation party against the four
Hezbollah suspects, especially with the trial date (in abstentia) approaching
and fixed to 25 March 2013. In the minds of 14 March figures, as the trial
would advance against Hezbollah members, the popularity of the party of God
would be shaken, and this during election year.
Until then, fearing another May 2008 violent showdown, 14 March leaders have decided to throw their internal wrath
against Nagib Mikati. The prime minister now faces a tough spot as the attack
happened on his watch while he is representing a pro-Syrian government, despite
ingenious manoeuvring to escape impossible contradictions during his mandate through
decisions that digressed from core 8 March interests. We can mention for
instance the funding of the Lebanese share of the STL, the spearheading of aid
towards the Syrian displaced usually considered as supporting the Free Syrian Army, or the
freezing of the wage increase, an important component of 8 March agenda, as a
gesture to the private sector. At the end of the line, Prime Minister Mikati
offered his resignation that has been, curious constitutional outcome,
“suspended”, as he is today threatened by experiencing the same political fate
as Omar Karame whose political carrier crashed back in April 2005 in close
circumstances.
Accumulating political and street
pressure against the present prime minister is a convenient way for 14 March to
be blaming a Sunni official for the death of another Sunni official, hence
hitting on Hezbollah’s hold over the government in an indirect fashion without
being accused of fuelling sectarianism, and eventually try and bring it down.
This short-term battle represents, for opposition figures, a small window
of opportunity to regain some political capital a few months before the 2013
elections, but at the cost of maintaining Lebanon in a state of tumult.
Beirut, 21 October 2012
[1] Saad Hariri interview to CNN, reported by The Daily Star, 20 October 2012,
available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Oct-20/192109-hariri-tells-cnn-hasan-killed-over-samaha-case.ashx#ixzz29owAYqFW
[3] Press conference of Samir Geagea in Meerab on 27
August 2011, cf. Geagea : L’acte d’accusation est basé sur suffisamment de
preuves, L’Orient-Le Jour, 28 August
2011.
Two Tales for Petro-Lebanon: Stagnation in the “Middle Ages” or Quantum Leap towards Modernity
Dr. Karim El Mufti
Political Scientist
Social Entrepreneur
9 October 2012
As the number of reports on the new oil and gas
wealth Lebanon holds in its sea is on the rise – understand between 40 and 100
billion dollars worth of reserves, depending on the estimates[1] –
it does not seem like the current Lebanese political groups are giving this
piece of information the attention it deserves.
Recently, Prime Minister Najib Mikati has put
much of his international networking skills fetching not only aid for the tens
of thousands of Syrian displaced on Lebanese soil (during the latest UN Summit
in New York), but for the cost of ammunition for the Lebanese army[2].
In recent tweets[3],
M. Mikati promised not to raise the issue of public wage hike to the Council of
Ministers before the Treasury could find a way to finance it (about 1.2
billion dollars), showing a chronic lack of imagination for diversifying the
State revenues (the “Mikati Floor”, raising the VAT rate), just as if the newly
established resources do not exist.
More preoccupying is the inability of the government
to name the members of the Board of the new Petroleum Administration, the body
in charge of managing the process that would supervise the drilling offshore, not
to mention the need to adopt a law on the
oil sovereign fund and to issue the executive decrees pertaining to oil and gas
regulations.
As Lebanese different political factions are triggering
their electoral campaigns, there is no mention, let again a vision, of a
financial strategy of how to use these newly discovered resources (that can in
theory be accessible within 6 to 10 years, and this is tomorrow[4]) for
the sake of the economic welfare of the country and its population. Only Minister Bassil, in his capacity of
Minister of Power and Hydraulic Resources showed eagerness to use the newly
found gas to help solve the electricity crisis in Lebanon[5],
but this is as far as his political platform has to offer on this issue.
Yet, the wealth potential of Lebanon is not
without consequences at the level of the country’s political economy. Taking
the “Corruption turn” and it is stagnation in the Middle Ages era – the country
is still enduring 20 years after the end of the civil war – that awaits[6]. Last
September 2011, LCPS Director Sami Atallah already warned that this matter “has the
potential to greatly undermine Lebanon’s economic and political system should
gas revenues be mismanaged”[7]. Pressure and momentum should be optimized without
any additional delay to secure an alternative tale for Lebanon’s economic
future that would give the necessary means and tools for a true modernization
process nationwide.
Three national economic priorities – at least –
can be identified at this stage.
First, reducing Lebanon’s National Debt that is
dangerously increasing year after year, reaching today 55.27 billion dollars[8].
This has put a lot of pressure on the ability of the Treasury to finance itself
through international credit mechanisms and has doomed any chance of a
financial independence for the country. With billions of dollars of extra
revenues each year thanks to oil and gas, Lebanon holds the power to
renegotiate its internal and external debts (while erasing some parts of it). Above
all, the newly acquired status of oil and gas exporter would render easier
access to financial markets with a better grading (today a mediocre “B1”
according to Moody’s ; “BB” for Standard & Poor’s) and lower interest
rates. This would provide greater visibility for the Lebanese authorities in
the future in dealing with public finance, maybe even favor the lowering of specific
taxes and encouraging both investment and consumption.
Second, Lebanon is in great need of investing
and modernizing its urban greater infrastructure. From its scattered urban
tissue in the capital Beirut to the marginalized urban areas of the rest of the
country, there is a real urge in reshaping the urban structure. By redesigning
towns, providing cheaper electricity and telecoms, connecting households to gas
and water, upgrading the sewage system, dealing with solid waste, integrating
the necessary road, rail, port, aerial and ferry infrastructure that would
support passenger commuting and merchandise transportation, Lebanon would
finally cross the modernity line. This investment plan, implemented through
public-private partnerships and other public management tools, would enhance
job creation and increase Lebanon’s GDP by at least 5 points, and more
importantly, drastically improve the population’s well being. Furthermore, the
State would be able to afford constructing public buildings instead of wasting
500 million dollars in rent each year for the offices of its various ministries
and public institutions.
Thirdly, the newly established wealth should be
used to strengthen social and health programs nationwide. The National Social
Security Funds (NSSF) is chronically indebted[9]
and proved catastrophic management, rendering social and health benefits
hazardous for low-income households. Modernizing the NSSF, financing public
hospitals, generalizing access to health and improving social programs (such as
the war handicapped whose fate fall under the national responsibility of the
ruling war lords or, for instance, caring for street children), would prove
essential for the well being of the population.
As Lebanon enters a new round of electoral
confrontation, a special focus should be given to the means of accessing
greater wealth for the State which should gain a rapid national consensus,
rather than sterile cleavages over regional choices that don’t even depend on
the will of the local war lords. The issue of modernizing Lebanon has been
pending for the past 40 years; needless to say it must be addressed immediately
by the competing political groups, at least through a national debate with all
stakeholders and civil society on the strategic implications of this new
component of Lebanese richness that would open a window of opportunity for a
much needed “quantum leap”. This debate
is now open...
[1] Britain-based Geo Ltd. Spectrum Company made an
initial assessment of the 3,000 square kilometres indicating there may be 25
trillion cubic feet of gas in the entire zone, source, estimating it is worth
$40 billion, The Daily Star, 25
September 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Lebanon/2012/Sep-25/189115-bassil-one-gas-well-provides-99-years-electricity.ashx#ixzz28jVzSTiv.
Roudi Baroudi, secretary-general of World Energy Council, pointed out that
Lebanon’s oil and gas wealth is much larger than what was unveiled by Spectrum:
“We estimate that Lebanon’s offshore can
produce up to 90,000 barrels of oil per day over the next 20 years, with the
market value of this output is around $100 billion”, The Daily Star, 22 September 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Sep-22/188868-experts-estimate-$40-bln-gas-reserves-off-lebanese-coast.ashx#ixzz28jWvJFwV
[2] The Daily Star,
4 October 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Oct-04/190099-mikati-seeks-funds-abroad-to-cover-army-plan.ashx
[4] Before reaching the production phase, oil and gas
operations go through four stages starting with reconnaissance, exploration
(three to five years), appraisal, (one to two years) and development (two to
three years), in The Daily Star, 25
September 2012, op. cit.
[6] During the period 1991-2006, Lebanon has spent 7.24
billion dollars on its infrastructure reconstruction and consolidation
projects, with the poor results we see today. Source: Council for
Reconstruction and Development, available on www.cdr.gov.lb/french/progress_reports/pr072007/index.asp
[7] Managing
Lebanon’s Gas: Pursuing a Pipe Dream? Al
Akhbar English Edition, 15 September 2011, available at http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/managing-lebanon%E2%80%99s-gas-pursuing-pipe-dream
[8]
A 3% increase compared to end of 2011, figure
for the end of second quarter of 2012, source: Quarterly Bulletin of the Ministry of Finance, Issue No. 21,
Quarter II 2012, available at http://www.finance.gov.lb/en-US/finance/PublicDebt/Documents/Quarterly%20Debt%20Report/2012/Debt%20and%20Debt%20Markets%20QII%202012.pdf
[9]
Approximately 3 billion dollars,
source: Byblos Bank Economic Analysis, Issue 258, April 2-7 2012, available at http://www.byblosbank.com/Library/Files/Lebanon/Publications/Economic%20Research/Lebanon%20This%20Week/LTW_258.pdf
Lebanon Downhill, a Mafiocracy in Action
Dr. Karim El Mufti
University teacher
Social entrepreneur
We need not talk about corruption in Lebanon anymore[1],
its Greater Corruption that has taken over the land of the Cedars. More than 20
years after the end of the civil war and dozens of billions of dollars swollen
up by the “costs” of reconstruction and rehabilitation, Lebanon’s situation
remains as if the conflict just ended. As such, the current economic and
social status appears to have worsened lately, as the infrastructure experienced
serious degradation, coming close to collapsing: sharp power blackouts[2],
mobile network failures, internet connection close to being the slowest in the
world[3],
absence of sustainable commuting system[4],
ravaging pollution[5],
rotten food[6],
fake medicine[7],
expanding chaotic urbanization and building structural failures[8],
destruction of ancient heritage[9],
not to mention that Beirut recently won the palm of the most expensive city in
the region[10].
The list goes on and on, putting the future of the country’s economic and
social welfare at great risk, not to mention the regression of human rights in
what used to be the most progressive Arab country as far as freedom of
expression is concerned[11].
The heavy militarization of policy making, which paramount represents the
preoccupying new political custom of electing a military commander as head of
State, along with the growing discretionary role of the General Security and
other security agencies, also send worrying signals as to where Lebanon is
headed. Not willing to tackle urgent socio-economic issues, the entirety of the
political class strategically relies on the security grip (each allied with a
particular security sector) to continue to impose the stability of a deeply
corrupted system.
This Greater Corruption has not only put a halt to the modernization of
the country, but has also established a very narrow profiting system in which
members of the political elite substantially feed from the different lucrative
sectors in our national economy, whether in public or private sector, thus
handing over the country’s (un)management to the hands of a mafiocracy. Monopolies have restricted a
big portion of the country’s wealth in the hands of a few ; unregulated banks
are no match to the rising challenge of financing growth and modern sectors of
economic activity ; the oil and gas reserves still await maritime exploitation
; consumers rights are left by the door not allowed any place in the system. Public
land is either leased to the private sector for symbolic dollars[12],
or partially privatized[13]
or closed down for any public community to share[14].
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) struggle to keep up with the heightening
costs of doing business due to the lack of investments in proper
infrastructure, causing heavy inflation of the costs of living for the Lebanese
population.
In order for this mafiocracy
to maintain its tight grip over Lebanon, three factors are in place. First, the
absence of the notion of conflict of interest that lost all legal and cultural
significance in both the public/private landscapes at all levels of the society[15].
Second, the protection umbrella granted by political and security actors tying
up the hands of the judiciary and any law enforcement attempt. Thirdly, the
continuous choice of policymakers to escape any reshuffling of the fiscal and
financial burden in a fair and responsible manner and continue to rely on two
major funding channels; for the State, dependency on foreign aid worth billions
of dollars; for the Lebanese households, dependency on the expatriates’ yearly
eight billion dollars sent to their families.
The effects of Greater Corruption led the social elevator to dramatically
slow down, as educated youth flee a shallow job market and real estate costs
suffocate young families now indebted for 20 or 30 years. As a result, grave
consequences are starting to surface; the recent hike in the number of bank
robberies, cases of breaking and entering, carjacking, looting and kidnapping (despite
the “security enforcement month” recently launched by Interior Minister Marwan
Charbel[16]),
represent only the tip of the iceberg. Add to that the hard strike launched by
EDL workers calling for an improvement of their working conditions, practically
ignored by relevant authorities, while other do-have in the country do not
share the fiscal burden within the national economy.
This alarming situation doesn’t seem to worry the ruling political class
who doesn’t appear keen to change the unwritten rules of the present political
economical system, despite the fact that we are approaching key parliamentarian
elections next summer. As a matter of fact, the partial election in Koura held on
15 July 2012[17]
shows how socio-economic factors are completely absent from the political
formations’ agendas. According to Ahmad Hariri, Secretary General of the Future
Movement, this partial election is a “prelude
of the 2013 elections which will determine the face of Lebanon in the future”[18];
no word (from either political sides) of the difficult living conditions in the
local areas of the district.
The current mafiocracy is a
collection of war makers, whether past or present. They have brought conflict,
destruction, displacement and today, greater corruption to a point of social
and economic depletion. As such, they represent the greatest menace for the
future of the country. They are, forever, indebted towards the children of the
civil war and the generations beyond.
15 July 2012
[1]
Transparency International ranks
Lebanon as 134th out of 183 countries on their perceptions of corruption index,
with a score of 2.5 out of 10, a level considered very corrupt. The country is
perceived as the 13th most corrupt in the region, in The Daily Star, 14 June 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Jun-14/176776-corruption-remains-rampant-in-lebanon-transparency-organization-warns.ashx#ixzz20lHszvbL
[2]
The latest power blackout was in June 2012, read http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Jun-19/177356-major-electricity-repairs-completed-following-lebanon-blackout.ashx#axzz20gJlIyn8
[3]
“Lebanon has slowest Internet connection in the world”,
Le Commerce du Levant, March 2011,
[4]
Read “La Loi des Bulldozers”, L’Orient
Le-Jour ,14 July 2012.
[5]
Read “Air Pollution linked to Cancer in Lebanon”,
The Daily Star, 28 July 2010.
[6]
In March 2012, a food safety crisis was revealed as several tons of meat,
chicken and fish were dumped throughout Lebanon by irresponsible restaurant
owners, read http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Mar-08/165939-authorities-confiscate-rotten-meat-and-chicken.ashx#axzz20gJlIyn8
[7]
Lebanon frequently has to deal with
counterfeit drugs on the local market leading to many fatal consequences, read
“Fake drugs are real threats”, Now Lebanon, 29 March 2010.
[8]
On 15 January 2012, a building collapsed in Fassouh neighborhood of Beirut
killing 27 people. Read http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Jan-16/159999-11-bodies-pulled-from-collapsed-beirut-building.ashx#axzz20gJlIyn8
[9]
The latest episode of the destruction of Lebanese Heritage was the devastation
by real estate promoters of ancient ruins on the Mina El Hosn protected site in
Beirut on 26 June 2012, read http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=415856
[11]
See the innovative civil society series Mamnou3/Forbidden,
A Lebanese web-series about the day-to-day inner workings of the country's
censorship bureau, www.mamnou3.com
[12]
For instance, the Golf Club in
Ouzai (South of Beirut), a select club established on a public lot, is rented
by the State to a private holding for 1.100 Lebanese Pounds a year (0.73$), cf An
Nahar, 6 April 2011. On another note, public coast land is rented to
private beach resorts by State for 4.5$ per sqm, as disclosed by Al Akhbar on 2 July 2012, cf http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/96703
[13] Like
the case of SOLIDERE, cf BEYHUM, Nabil. The Crisis of Urban Culture: The
Three Reconstruction Plans for Beirut. The Beirut Review, n°4, Fall 1992
[14] Like
the case of Horsh Beirut, the Pine Forest at the heart of Beirut closed to the
public, cf “Beirut’s lone public park isn’t”, Los Angeles
Times, 7 January 2011.
[15]
On Lebanon’s contemporary pathology,
read Samir Khalaf, Lebanon Adrift,
Saqi Books, 2012
[17] Due
to the passing away of district’s MP Farid Habib.
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