Tumultuous Lebanon, Where the Intelligence War Never Pauses

Dr. Karim El Mufti

University Professor

Political Scientist

It took longer than usual compared with other political assassinations (given the high secrecy linked to security related areas), but the information eventually came out, the head of the Intelligence Branch of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), Brigadier Wissam El Hassan, was targeted and terminated.

1. The political war and Syria

Minutes into the Ashrafieh blast and 14 March local figures were already trying to make political good fortune out of the tragedy, raising the scenario of an alleged targeting of the Kataeb House, or the 14 March General Secretariat office, or even how Syria the terrorist “targeted the heart of a Lebanese Christian area”. The context changed once the announcement broke of the direct plot against the ISF Brigadier, even though the accused party remained the same: Syria had killed Al Hassan in “retaliation of the arrest of Michel Samaha”, the close advisor of Bashar Al Assad ; he was targeted because of the “efforts made by the ISF to stop Syrian infiltrations into Lebanon”.

Blaming directly the Syrian regime for the terrorist blast, self-exiled Saad Hariri was, from day one, trying to use the killing as a high horse to make a comeback onto the Lebanese political landscape after a period of political numbness: “if I were prime minister, my actions would be to stand against Bachar el Assad and say very clearly that anything that will come into Lebanon, if the regime is trying to export its terrorists to Lebanon, we would definitely refuse it”[1].

Other spokespersons from the 14 March coalition carried on with the interpretation that this attack was an export of the Syrian conflict into the heart of the Lebanese capital. As clearly put by Kataeb president and anti-Syrian figure, Amine El Gemayel, to the LBC television : “This regime, which is crumbling, is trying to export its conflict to Lebanon”.

But this explanation falls short when, at the same time, the same anti-Syrian coalition eagerly connected the attack (due to “troubling similarities”) with past attacks on anti-Syrian figures (Gebran Tueni or Antoine Ghanem for instance), at a time when “Syria al Assad” was well up on its feet, way before the civil war there.  

Still, there is no doubt in the extensiveness of the blow the anti-Syrian coalition 14 March has just received with the decapitation of the head of a security service loyal to its agenda. Along with other public administrations, like the Council for Reconstruction and Development and Ogero within the Telecommunications Ministry, this ISF branch represented little of what was left of the opposition’s influence within State institutions, remotely led by Saad Hariri since he was removed from power in January of last year. Given the sensitive and strategic nature of the Information Branch within the ISF, needless to say how enduring the hit came to the political leverage of the 14 March coalition.

2. The evidence war and the STL

Wissam Al Hassan was not only a top security operative who made possible the dismantlement of pro-Israeli cells, or the arrest of former Minister Michel Samaha last August for planning to carry out terrorist attacks on Lebanese soil, he was most importantly in charge of the Lebanese side of the investigation of Rafic Hariri’s assassination. Brigadier Al Hassan was hence among the people the prosecutor at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) could count on in order to build his case. In that, the indictment against the four members of Hezbollah is based, in the prosecutor’s own words, on “circumstantial evidence”[2] related to a series of interconnected telecommunications cells that were operating in preparation to the attack, and that were allegedly set up by the four suspects yet to be arrested.  

With the overturn of the political equilibrium and the formation of the 8 March pro-Syrian government, which is hostile to the STL work, the intelligence unit run by Brigadier Al Hassan had the mission of keeping the cooperation with the STL’s prosecutor alive. It is important to highlight that the ISF Information Branch is the unit that uncovered the telecommunications cells’ matrix (with the support of another police martyr and IT expert, Captain Wissam Eid, assassinated in January 2008), before linking it to Hezbollah members, and then possibly leaking the information to Der Spiegel who suggested this eventuality in May 2009, two years before the indictment was issued. Since that time, a crucial target shift has taken place, passing from the suspicion of an official Syrian involvement to a Lebanese (Hezbollah) involvement in the assassination of Rafic Hariri.

As such, anti-Hezbollah formations in Lebanon had high hopes in the work of the ISF intelligence branch as it was fuelling, genuinely or not, the accusation party, despite the loss of control over the government. Whether these pieces of evidence were authentic or not was never really the primary concern of the 14 March coalition. Some opposition figures, like Samir Geagea, chose to entirely endorse the views of the prosecutor as to the involvement of Hezbollah suspects[3], even before the pre-trial Judge had set a trial date, whereas Hezbollah officials regularly rejected the telecommunications related evidence considering it fabricated. 

This evidence war, that will contribute to determine the fate and outcome of the coming trial, has put Brigadier Wissam El Hassan at the centre of a vast intelligence (national, regional and international) confrontation, as he fell victim of irreconcilable conflicting interests where the battles behind the scenes never pause. 

3. The 14 March window of opportunity to regain political ground

For the opposition group, the killing of Al Hassan has hence taken away a strong Lebanese ally in the investigation team that would have been keen on beefing up the accusation party against the four Hezbollah suspects, especially with the trial date (in abstentia) approaching and fixed to 25 March 2013. In the minds of 14 March figures, as the trial would advance against Hezbollah members, the popularity of the party of God would be shaken, and this during election year.

Until then, fearing another May 2008 violent showdown, 14 March leaders have decided to throw their internal wrath against Nagib Mikati. The prime minister now faces a tough spot as the attack happened on his watch while he is representing a pro-Syrian government, despite ingenious manoeuvring to escape impossible contradictions during his mandate through decisions that digressed from core 8 March interests. We can mention for instance the funding of the Lebanese share of the STL, the spearheading of aid towards the Syrian displaced usually considered as supporting the Free Syrian Army, or the freezing of the wage increase, an important component of 8 March agenda, as a gesture to the private sector. At the end of the line, Prime Minister Mikati offered his resignation that has been, curious constitutional outcome, “suspended”, as he is today threatened by experiencing the same political fate as Omar Karame whose political carrier crashed back in April 2005 in close circumstances.

 

Accumulating political and street pressure against the present prime minister is a convenient way for 14 March to be blaming a Sunni official for the death of another Sunni official, hence hitting on Hezbollah’s hold over the government in an indirect fashion without being accused of fuelling sectarianism, and eventually try and bring it down. This short-term battle represents, for opposition figures, a small window of opportunity to regain some political capital a few months before the 2013 elections, but at the cost of maintaining Lebanon in a state of tumult.

Beirut, 21 October 2012

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[1] Saad Hariri interview to CNN, reported by The Daily Star, 20 October 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Oct-20/192109-hariri-tells-cnn-hasan-killed-over-samaha-case.ashx#ixzz29owAYqFW 

[2] §3, p.3 of the indictment

[3] Press conference of Samir Geagea in Meerab on 27 August 2011, cf. Geagea : L’acte d’accusation est basé sur suffisamment de preuves, L’Orient-Le Jour, 28 August 2011.

Two Tales for Petro-Lebanon: Stagnation in the “Middle Ages” or Quantum Leap towards Modernity

Dr. Karim El Mufti

Political Scientist

Social Entrepreneur

9 October 2012 

As the number of reports on the new oil and gas wealth Lebanon holds in its sea is on the rise – understand between 40 and 100 billion dollars worth of reserves, depending on the estimates[1] – it does not seem like the current Lebanese political groups are giving this piece of information the attention it deserves.

Recently, Prime Minister Najib Mikati has put much of his international networking skills fetching not only aid for the tens of thousands of Syrian displaced on Lebanese soil (during the latest UN Summit in New York), but for the cost of ammunition for the Lebanese army[2]. In recent tweets[3], M. Mikati promised not to raise the issue of public wage hike to the Council of Ministers before the Treasury could find a way to finance it (about 1.2 billion dollars), showing a chronic lack of imagination for diversifying the State revenues (the “Mikati Floor”, raising the VAT rate), just as if the newly established resources do not exist.

More preoccupying is the inability of the government to name the members of the Board of the new Petroleum Administration, the body in charge of managing the process that would supervise the drilling offshore, not to mention the need to adopt a law on the oil sovereign fund and to issue the executive decrees pertaining to oil and gas regulations.

As Lebanese different political factions are triggering their electoral campaigns, there is no mention, let again a vision, of a financial strategy of how to use these newly discovered resources (that can in theory be accessible within 6 to 10 years, and this is tomorrow[4]) for the sake of the economic welfare of the country and its population.  Only Minister Bassil, in his capacity of Minister of Power and Hydraulic Resources showed eagerness to use the newly found gas to help solve the electricity crisis in Lebanon[5], but this is as far as his political platform has to offer on this issue.

Yet, the wealth potential of Lebanon is not without consequences at the level of the country’s political economy. Taking the “Corruption turn” and it is stagnation in the Middle Ages era – the country is still enduring 20 years after the end of the civil war – that awaits[6]. Last September 2011, LCPS Director Sami Atallah already warned that this matter “has the potential to greatly undermine Lebanon’s economic and political system should gas revenues be mismanaged”[7]. Pressure and momentum should be optimized without any additional delay to secure an alternative tale for Lebanon’s economic future that would give the necessary means and tools for a true modernization process nationwide.  

Three national economic priorities – at least – can be identified at this stage.

First, reducing Lebanon’s National Debt that is dangerously increasing year after year, reaching today 55.27 billion dollars[8]. This has put a lot of pressure on the ability of the Treasury to finance itself through international credit mechanisms and has doomed any chance of a financial independence for the country. With billions of dollars of extra revenues each year thanks to oil and gas, Lebanon holds the power to renegotiate its internal and external debts (while erasing some parts of it). Above all, the newly acquired status of oil and gas exporter would render easier access to financial markets with a better grading (today a mediocre “B1” according to Moody’s ; “BB” for Standard & Poor’s) and lower interest rates. This would provide greater visibility for the Lebanese authorities in the future in dealing with public finance, maybe even favor the lowering of specific taxes and encouraging both investment and consumption.

Second, Lebanon is in great need of investing and modernizing its urban greater infrastructure. From its scattered urban tissue in the capital Beirut to the marginalized urban areas of the rest of the country, there is a real urge in reshaping the urban structure. By redesigning towns, providing cheaper electricity and telecoms, connecting households to gas and water, upgrading the sewage system, dealing with solid waste, integrating the necessary road, rail, port, aerial and ferry infrastructure that would support passenger commuting and merchandise transportation, Lebanon would finally cross the modernity line. This investment plan, implemented through public-private partnerships and other public management tools, would enhance job creation and increase Lebanon’s GDP by at least 5 points, and more importantly, drastically improve the population’s well being. Furthermore, the State would be able to afford constructing public buildings instead of wasting 500 million dollars in rent each year for the offices of its various ministries and public institutions.

Thirdly, the newly established wealth should be used to strengthen social and health programs nationwide. The National Social Security Funds (NSSF) is chronically indebted[9] and proved catastrophic management, rendering social and health benefits hazardous for low-income households. Modernizing the NSSF, financing public hospitals, generalizing access to health and improving social programs (such as the war handicapped whose fate fall under the national responsibility of the ruling war lords or, for instance, caring for street children), would prove essential for the well being of the population.

As Lebanon enters a new round of electoral confrontation, a special focus should be given to the means of accessing greater wealth for the State which should gain a rapid national consensus, rather than sterile cleavages over regional choices that don’t even depend on the will of the local war lords. The issue of modernizing Lebanon has been pending for the past 40 years; needless to say it must be addressed immediately by the competing political groups, at least through a national debate with all stakeholders and civil society on the strategic implications of this new component of Lebanese richness that would open a window of opportunity for a much needed “quantum leap”.  This debate is now open...

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[1] Britain-based Geo Ltd. Spectrum Company made an initial assessment of the 3,000 square kilometres indicating there may be 25 trillion cubic feet of gas in the entire zone, source, estimating it is worth $40 billion, The Daily Star, 25 September 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Lebanon/2012/Sep-25/189115-bassil-one-gas-well-provides-99-years-electricity.ashx#ixzz28jVzSTiv. Roudi Baroudi, secretary-general of World Energy Council, pointed out that Lebanon’s oil and gas wealth is much larger than what was unveiled by Spectrum: “We estimate that Lebanon’s offshore can produce up to 90,000 barrels of oil per day over the next 20 years, with the market value of this output is around $100 billion”, The Daily Star, 22 September 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Sep-22/188868-experts-estimate-$40-bln-gas-reserves-off-lebanese-coast.ashx#ixzz28jWvJFwV

[2] The Daily Star, 4 October 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Oct-04/190099-mikati-seeks-funds-abroad-to-cover-army-plan.ashx

[3] On his account @Najib_Mikati, 3 October 2012, 4.53am

[4] Before reaching the production phase, oil and gas operations go through four stages starting with reconnaissance, exploration (three to five years), appraisal, (one to two years) and development (two to three years), in The Daily Star, 25 September 2012, op. cit.

[5] Bassil: One gas well provides 99 years electricity, The Daily Star, 25 September 2012, op. cit.

[6] During the period 1991-2006, Lebanon has spent 7.24 billion dollars on its infrastructure reconstruction and consolidation projects, with the poor results we see today. Source: Council for Reconstruction and Development, available on www.cdr.gov.lb/french/progress_reports/pr072007/index.asp

[7] Managing Lebanon’s Gas: Pursuing a Pipe Dream? Al Akhbar English Edition, 15 September 2011, available at http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/managing-lebanon%E2%80%99s-gas-pursuing-pipe-dream

[8] A 3% increase compared to end of 2011, figure for the end of second quarter of 2012, source: Quarterly Bulletin of the Ministry of Finance, Issue No. 21, Quarter II 2012, available at http://www.finance.gov.lb/en-US/finance/PublicDebt/Documents/Quarterly%20Debt%20Report/2012/Debt%20and%20Debt%20Markets%20QII%202012.pdf

[9] Approximately 3 billion dollars, source: Byblos Bank Economic Analysis, Issue 258, April 2-7 2012, available at http://www.byblosbank.com/Library/Files/Lebanon/Publications/Economic%20Research/Lebanon%20This%20Week/LTW_258.pdf

Lebanon Downhill, a Mafiocracy in Action

Dr. Karim El Mufti

University teacher 

Social entrepreneur

We need not talk about corruption in Lebanon anymore[1], its Greater Corruption that has taken over the land of the Cedars. More than 20 years after the end of the civil war and dozens of billions of dollars swollen up by the “costs” of reconstruction and rehabilitation, Lebanon’s situation remains as if the conflict just ended. As such, the current economic and social status appears to have worsened lately, as the infrastructure experienced serious degradation, coming close to collapsing: sharp power blackouts[2], mobile network failures, internet connection close to being the slowest in the world[3], absence of sustainable commuting system[4], ravaging pollution[5], rotten food[6], fake medicine[7], expanding chaotic urbanization and building structural failures[8], destruction of ancient heritage[9], not to mention that Beirut recently won the palm of the most expensive city in the region[10].

The list goes on and on, putting the future of the country’s economic and social welfare at great risk, not to mention the regression of human rights in what used to be the most progressive Arab country as far as freedom of expression is concerned[11]. The heavy militarization of policy making, which paramount represents the preoccupying new political custom of electing a military commander as head of State, along with the growing discretionary role of the General Security and other security agencies, also send worrying signals as to where Lebanon is headed. Not willing to tackle urgent socio-economic issues, the entirety of the political class strategically relies on the security grip (each allied with a particular security sector) to continue to impose the stability of a deeply corrupted system.

This Greater Corruption has not only put a halt to the modernization of the country, but has also established a very narrow profiting system in which members of the political elite substantially feed from the different lucrative sectors in our national economy, whether in public or private sector, thus handing over the country’s (un)management to the hands of a mafiocracy. Monopolies have restricted a big portion of the country’s wealth in the hands of a few ; unregulated banks are no match to the rising challenge of financing growth and modern sectors of economic activity ; the oil and gas reserves still await maritime exploitation ; consumers rights are left by the door not allowed any place in the system. Public land is either leased to the private sector for symbolic dollars[12], or partially privatized[13] or closed down for any public community to share[14]. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) struggle to keep up with the heightening costs of doing business due to the lack of investments in proper infrastructure, causing heavy inflation of the costs of living for the Lebanese population.

In order for this mafiocracy to maintain its tight grip over Lebanon, three factors are in place. First, the absence of the notion of conflict of interest that lost all legal and cultural significance in both the public/private landscapes at all levels of the society[15]. Second, the protection umbrella granted by political and security actors tying up the hands of the judiciary and any law enforcement attempt. Thirdly, the continuous choice of policymakers to escape any reshuffling of the fiscal and financial burden in a fair and responsible manner and continue to rely on two major funding channels; for the State, dependency on foreign aid worth billions of dollars; for the Lebanese households, dependency on the expatriates’ yearly eight billion dollars sent to their families.

The effects of Greater Corruption led the social elevator to dramatically slow down, as educated youth flee a shallow job market and real estate costs suffocate young families now indebted for 20 or 30 years. As a result, grave consequences are starting to surface; the recent hike in the number of bank robberies, cases of breaking and entering, carjacking, looting and kidnapping (despite the “security enforcement month” recently launched by Interior Minister Marwan Charbel[16]), represent only the tip of the iceberg. Add to that the hard strike launched by EDL workers calling for an improvement of their working conditions, practically ignored by relevant authorities, while other do-have in the country do not share the fiscal burden within the national economy.

This alarming situation doesn’t seem to worry the ruling political class who doesn’t appear keen to change the unwritten rules of the present political economical system, despite the fact that we are approaching key parliamentarian elections next summer. As a matter of fact, the partial election in Koura held on 15 July 2012[17] shows how socio-economic factors are completely absent from the political formations’ agendas. According to Ahmad Hariri, Secretary General of the Future Movement, this partial election is a “prelude of the 2013 elections which will determine the face of Lebanon in the future”[18]; no word (from either political sides) of the difficult living conditions in the local areas of the district.

The current mafiocracy is a collection of war makers, whether past or present. They have brought conflict, destruction, displacement and today, greater corruption to a point of social and economic depletion. As such, they represent the greatest menace for the future of the country. They are, forever, indebted towards the children of the civil war and the generations beyond.

15 July 2012

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[1] Transparency International ranks Lebanon as 134th out of 183 countries on their perceptions of corruption index, with a score of 2.5 out of 10, a level considered very corrupt. The country is perceived as the 13th most corrupt in the region, in The Daily Star, 14 June 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Jun-14/176776-corruption-remains-rampant-in-lebanon-transparency-organization-warns.ashx#ixzz20lHszvbL

[2] The latest power blackout was in June 2012, read http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Jun-19/177356-major-electricity-repairs-completed-following-lebanon-blackout.ashx#axzz20gJlIyn8

[3] “Lebanon has slowest Internet connection in the world”, Le Commerce du Levant, March 2011,

[4] Read “La Loi des Bulldozers”, L’Orient Le-Jour ,14 July 2012.

[5] Read “Air Pollution linked to Cancer in Lebanon”, The Daily Star, 28 July 2010.

[6] In March 2012, a food safety crisis was revealed as several tons of meat, chicken and fish were dumped throughout Lebanon by irresponsible restaurant owners, read http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Mar-08/165939-authorities-confiscate-rotten-meat-and-chicken.ashx#axzz20gJlIyn8

[7] Lebanon frequently has to deal with counterfeit drugs on the local market leading to many fatal consequences, read “Fake drugs are real threats”, Now Lebanon, 29 March 2010.

[8] On 15 January 2012, a building collapsed in Fassouh neighborhood of Beirut killing 27 people. Read http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Jan-16/159999-11-bodies-pulled-from-collapsed-beirut-building.ashx#axzz20gJlIyn8

[9] The latest episode of the destruction of Lebanese Heritage was the devastation by real estate promoters of ancient ruins on the Mina El Hosn protected site in Beirut on 26 June 2012, read http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=415856 

[10] Cf http://www.ameinfo.com/beirut-replaces-abu-dhabi-expensive-city-303508

[11] See the innovative civil society series Mamnou3/Forbidden, A Lebanese web-series about the day-to-day inner workings of the country's censorship bureau, www.mamnou3.com

[12] For instance, the Golf Club in Ouzai (South of Beirut), a select club established on a public lot, is rented by the State to a private holding for 1.100 Lebanese Pounds a year (0.73$), cf An Nahar, 6 April 2011. On another note, public coast land is rented to private beach resorts by State for 4.5$ per sqm, as disclosed by Al Akhbar on 2 July 2012, cf http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/96703

[13] Like the case of SOLIDERE, cf BEYHUM, Nabil. The Crisis of Urban Culture: The Three Reconstruction Plans for Beirut. The Beirut Review, n°4, Fall 1992

[14] Like the case of Horsh Beirut, the Pine Forest at the heart of Beirut closed to the public, cf “Beirut’s lone public park isn’t”, Los Angeles Times, 7 January 2011.

[15] On Lebanon’s contemporary pathology, read Samir Khalaf, Lebanon Adrift, Saqi Books, 2012

[16] Cf http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=412290

[17] Due to the passing away of district’s MP Farid Habib.

[18] Cf http://www.lebanonfiles.com/news/409701

Conférence à l'IFPO le jeudi 14 juin 2012 sur la gestion de copropriété dans un quartier multicommunautaire de Beyrouth (Moussaitbeh), ethnographie d’une citoyenneté locale

Interview in Le Soir-Echos (Rabat) on Democratic Transitions and Arab Spring

Les Révolutions Arabes vues par El Mufti

Ecrit par Céline Girard le 2 mars 2012

Dr. Karim el Mufti (en médaillon): «tout soulèvement ou renversement à l’encontre d’une autocratie ne s’oriente pas forcément vers une transition démocratique»

Karim El Mufti a orienté ses recherches vers la reconstruction d’État (state-building), notamment dans les sociétés plurielles et multicommunautaires, travaillant sur les contextes libanais et ex-yougoslave. Cet entretien a été réalisé en marge de sa conférence, jeudi à Rabat, à l’invitation de l’École de gouvernance et d’économie (EGE) et son centre de recherche sur l’Afrique et la Méditerranée (CERAM).


L’immolation du tunisien Mohammed Bouazizi le 17 décembre 2010 n’est pas sans rappeler le geste du tchèque Jan Palach en 1969. Y a-t-il lieu de faire un parallèle entre ces deux actes ?
Effectivement, ces actes désespérés se multiplient dans un climat de dictature répressive. Ils furent d’ailleurs observés à de nombreuses reprises dans d’autres régions tunisiennes, en Égypte ainsi qu’en Libye, mais c’est l’acte de Mohammad Bouazizi qui forgea cette dimension symbolique associée à l’affrontement entre la rue et la dictature de manière générale. Par ailleurs, l’immolation, comme forme de protestation ultime et extrême, se retrouve dans d’autres contextes tout aussi répressifs sans que cela n’ait pu amorcer un soulèvement général apportant un coup fatal au régime en place, comme lors du geste de Jan Palach en Tchécoslovaquie. Plus proche de notre époque, je pense également au Tibet.

Au-delà de ce geste déclencheur, quels éléments permettent de construire une analyse comparative entre le printemps arabe et les transitions démocratiques en Europe ?
Tout d’abord, l’approche comparative porte en elle des limitations d’ordre empirique. Tout soulèvement ou renversement à l’encontre d’une autocratie ne s’oriente pas forcément vers une transition démocratique: le Chili de Pinochet, l’Iran de Khomeyni, la Libye de Khadafi ou la Syrie des Assad ont ainsi défié l’approche déterministe qui implique un sens unique à l’Histoire des sociétés en direction de la démocratie et l’économie de marché.
En revanche, la multiplication des vagues de démocratisation dans des contextes divers, en Europe du sud, en Amérique Latine, en Europe de l’Est et dans les Balkans, favorise une réflexion de type comparatif sur les facteurs ayant initié un changement de régime, voire une révolution, et la manière dont les transitions furent gérées, selon quels rapports de force, et pour construire quels types de régimes.

Quels enseignements nous apporte cette mise en perspective ?
Il est intéressant de noter une constante dans les périodes de transition démocratique, à savoir celle d’une recherche d’une nouvelle légitimité politique qui se veut moderne, donc issue d’un processus proprement institutionnel : échéances électorales, réformes constitutionnelles et politiques, respect des droits de l’homme, renforcement de l’indépendance du judiciaire, soumission de l’armée au pouvoir civil, etc.
Dans les trois pays du printemps arabe ayant amorcé leur transition démocratique, celle-ci s’est à chaque fois orientée vers un choix de consolidation institutionnelle vue comme marque absolue de modernité politique. Ainsi l’Égypte a amendé sa constitution et procédé à des élections, la Tunisie a mis en place une Assemblée constituante élue afin de diriger un nettoyage constitutionnel en profondeur et la Libye, malgré un contexte post-révolutionnaire chaotique, tente tant bien que mal de jalonner un chemin pouvant garantir la tenue d’élections d’ici le mois de juin.
Un autre indicateur est à lire dans la place laissée aux acteurs du régime déchu. Il n’est pas rare que les transitions démocratiques se fassent tout en associant des piliers de l’ancien régime, comme lors du coup d’État au Portugal en 1974 ou l’Espagne post-franquiste. La question se pose d’autant plus sachant que les transitions arabes qui viennent de porter de nouveaux acteurs politiques sur le devant de la scène (les formations islamistes) luttent en ce moment avec la question de la coopération avec les protagonistes influents de l’époque de la dictature, tel l’armée par exemple.

Un rapport à la mi-février par le Centre international de recherche et d’étude sur le terrorisme et d’aide aux victimes du terrorisme (CIRET-AVT) qualifie la situation en Syrie de « libanisation fabriquée ». Qu’en pensez-vous ? Y a-t-il lieu de faire un rapprochement ?
La situation en Syrie aujourd’hui et l’utilisation de plus en plus marquée de la grille de lecture confessionnelle présente effectivement des rapprochements faciles avec le concept de libanisation qui sous-entend une fragmentation du tissu social selon des lignes de clivage confessionnelles. Néanmoins, le pluralisme religieux syrien n’a pas encore pris une tournure expressément politique, à la manière dont s’est construite la pratique politico-communautaire proprement libanaise. Les enjeux du soulèvement de la rue syrienne contre le régime quadragénaire de la dynastie Assad ne sont pas directement liés à la mainmise alaouite du clan Assad sur le pays. La doctrine baasiste et socialiste de la Syrie a pu instaurer un système d’État providence, qui a bénéficié à l’ensemble des couches de la population sans distinction de communauté ou de religion. Par contre, les excès et la corruption d’une classe d’oligarque qui a pu se former à l’ombre de la dynastie Assad, conjuguée à la paupérisation de plus en plus grandissante de la jeunesse syrienne du fait de l’incapacité du régime à moderniser son système économique, a contribué à nourrir la vague de contestation à l’encontre de la nature répressive du régime. ◆

http://www.lesoir-echos.com/les-revolutions-arabes-vues-par-el-mufti/monde/46746/