Troubles du 6 juin : la stratégie de verrouillage du régime libanais

Par Karim El Mufti
Enseignant-chercheur en science politique et droit international. Directeur de la Clinique juridique des droits de l’homme à l’Université La Sagesse.
 
Publié dans L'Orient Le Jour le 13 juin 2020
https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1221736/troubles-du-6-juin-la-strategie-de-verrouillage-du-regime-politico-communautaire.html 

Le gouvernement de Hassane Diab aura vu, malgré lui, son vœu exaucé en ce samedi 6 juin 2020, celui d’apparaître comme purement « technocrate », tandis qu’il se trouvait impuissant face aux violences communautaires qui faillirent mettre le feu aux poudres au sein de trois quartiers bien marqués politiquement (Ring/Khandak el-Ghamik ; Aïn el-Remmané/Chiyah ; Barbour/Tarik Jdidé). Aux abonnés absents, le cabinet a démontré une fois de plus que le pouvoir réel était détenu par les formations politico-communautaires. Ce sont en effet elles qui ont réagi les premières afin de circonscrire les tensions et calmer la rue confessionnelle à coups de « contacts politiques » et de déclarations se voulant garantes du « vivre-ensemble ». Le cas échéant, l’impact du cabinet aura été bien maigre, démontrant une fois de plus sa dépendance vis-à-vis de ses parrains politiques. Dans les semaines précédentes, tandis que le pays entamait bon an mal an le déconfinement, les groupes de pression et de protestation redevenaient de plus en plus actifs sur le terrain, se promettant de redoubler d’efforts pour réactiver l’esprit de la « révolution » du 17 octobre. Et ce d’autant que la situation socio-économique a bien empiré depuis le bouclage du pays en mars dernier : la valeur de la livre libanaise poursuivait sa lente dépréciation par rapport au dollar, affectant sévèrement le marché du travail, le taux de chômage et le coût de la vie quotidienne. Dès la fin du mois d’avril, certains groupes croisaient déjà le fer avec l’armée dans des heurts qui firent un nouveau mort parmi les manifestants. Fawwaz Samman fut ainsi tué le 27 avril à Tripoli par la répression des forces armées chargées d’une mission pour laquelle elles ne sont pourtant pas entraînées. La violence exercée par l’armée contre les manifestants fut particulièrement brutale, des actes de torture ayant notamment été rapportés par les personnes qui furent arrêtées.

Double décrédibilisation
Dans un tel contexte explosif, il y avait fort à parier qu’une réorganisation des groupes de contestation, à l’orée du déconfinement, dérangerait le régime politico-communautaire en place, lequel a recouru à sa planche de salut habituelle, celle du péril confessionnel. Selon une chorégraphie bien ficelée, les différents acteurs politiques ont ainsi œuvré à une stratégie de décrédibilisation sur deux champs.

D’abord, en semant la confusion sur le plan des revendications des groupes alternatifs dont les slogans ont subi un certain flottement la semaine précédant la journée du 6 juin. Fut ainsi remise sur le tapis la question de l’application des résolutions 1559 (appelant au désarmement de l’ensemble des milices) et 1701 (autorisant un accroissement des effectifs de la Finul afin d’aider l’armée libanaise à sécuriser la frontière sud) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies qui rouvrit en surface le clivage ancien des 8 et 14 Mars. Ces tergiversations ont conduit à la tenue, à une date différente, de deux marches séparées contre le pouvoir. Voulant échapper aux polémiques s’agissant des slogans du 6 juin, une manifestation fut organisée à Saïda la veille, appelant à une « transition pacifique du pouvoir » via la pression populaire. Le gros des groupes contestataires s’est quant à lui réuni comme initialement prévu le 6 juin au centre-ville de Beyrouth. Parmi ceux-ci, une vingtaine signèrent une déclaration commune revendiquant un « gouvernement de transition doté de prérogatives exceptionnelles » ainsi que la mise sur pied d’un comité électoral indépendant ayant en charge la tenue d’élections législatives anticipées.

Devant les dérapages du 6 juin, les partis traditionnels, pourtant responsables de ces débordements, se sont rapidement drapés en gardiens de la concorde intercommunautaire, seuls « capables » de stopper la spirale de la violence. Se désignant ainsi comme les « adultes dans la pièce », ils comptent exacerber le décalage avec les autres acteurs et figures se posant en alternative. Dans un même temps, cet épisode aura confisqué l’attention médiatique dont auraient pu profiter les groupes de contestation dans ce contexte propice, victimes au contraire d’un brouillage de leur message. Paradoxalement, la plus forte mobilisation au lendemain des violences fut celle appelant au « renforcement de la paix civile et du rejet de la discorde », organisée au musée de Beyrouth sous l’égide des présidents des ordres des professions libérales et des universités privées, dont ce n’est a priori pas le rôle premier depuis la structuration de formation issues de la société civile. De leur côté, les groupes politiques alternatifs réagissaient par communiqués...

La seconde victime de l’action de décrédibilisation se trouve être le Premier ministre Hassane Diab. Le tout récent tournant des manifestations et des actions dans la rue incluant les sympathisants d’Amal et du Hezbollah parmi les rangs de la contestation jeudi soir semble confirmer la pression qu’entendent faire monter les tenants du régime contre le chef du gouvernement et vise à lui rappeler combien son mandat ne tient qu’à un fil. Ce revirement vis-à-vis du cabinet, pourtant initialement soutenu, fait suite à une série de mésaventures du Premier ministre. En effet, celui-ci fut sensiblement affaibli par un certain nombre de mauvais calculs politiques. Parmi lesquels figure la tentative de limoger le gouverneur de la Banque centrale Riad Salamé, maladroite aussi bien sur le fond (en évaluant mal le cours du rapport de force) que sur la forme (en improvisant ouvertement un tour de table des opinions durant une session en Conseil des ministres). On peut aussi mentionner l’autorisation accordée à la construction d’une centrale électrique à Selaata (sur pression du Courant patriotique libre), alors que le gouvernement l’avait préalablement rejetée. Les récentes nominations administratives approuvées en Conseil des ministres, attribuées selon les codes népotiques et communautaristes en place, aggravent ultérieurement la perte de crédibilité du Premier ministre, apparaissant comme présidant une chambre d’enregistrement des intérêts des formations traditionnelles. Cet isolement préserve donc le champ politique des forces politico-communautaires qui excellent dans la gestion des crises et peuvent compter sur des noyaux durs de partisans pour le quadrillage du terrain.

Pouvoir de nuisance
Rappelons que durant les élections parlementaires de mai 2018, les six partis politico-communautaires (Hezbollah, CPL, Futur, Amal, FL, PSP) ont rassemblé 69,22 % des voix exprimées, tandis que les listes issues de la société civile n’en ont obtenu que 2,28 %. En prenant en compte l’important taux d’abstention (50,32 %), la représentativité politique, sur l’ensemble des électeurs inscrits, des forces politico-communautaires tombe à 34,39 %. Cela laisse certes ouvertes les opportunités pour les groupes alternatifs de se constituer éventuellement une base électorale. Mais pour les tenants du régime, cette marge (s’y ajoutent les composantes alliées et amies) reste assez confortable pour conserver l’exercice de leur pouvoir de nuisance.

Situé au cœur de leur stratégie de pompiers-pyromanes, le recours à la violence politique par les forces politico-communautaires réaffirme le cas échéant l’accès aux dividendes (sur tous les plans) des pseudo-réconciliations. Ces partis se posent en champions de la préservation de la coexistence pacifique et, ce faisant, parviennent à monopoliser les arcanes du pouvoir. L’intensité de cette violence politique n’est plus à démontrer. Sur la seule décennie précédente, rappelons les attaques des milices du 8 Mars en mai 2008, qui donnèrent lieu à l’accord de Doha, promettant la continuité de la gouvernance politique selon les mêmes codes consociatifs. Les clashs de Jabal Mohsen et Bab el-Tebbaneh (entre 2011 et 2014), de Jahliyeh (tentative d’arrestation musclée de Wi’am Wahhab en décembre 2018) ou ceux de Qabr Chmoun de juin 2019 sont, eux, autant de cas d’école dans lesquels les « contacts politiques » en haut lieu finissent par paver la voie à la désescalade et la conciliation.
Il s’agit là du principal vecteur de verrouillage du régime libanais par les parrains politico-communautaires. La neutralisation de cette dynamique de manipulation figure parmi les défis les plus cruciaux des groupes politiques alternatifs engagés dans la bataille pour s’imposer auprès d’une opinion publique sensiblement exposée aux dommages systémiques de la récession économique.

Lebanon Protests: The End of the Longstanding Resilience?

By Karim El Mufti
Published in Beirut Today, on October 20, 2019

Both celebrated and cursed, the Lebanese resilience –or capacity to endure the toughest of situations and contexts, is engraved in the known saying: “Like a Phoenix, Lebanon shall always rise from its ashes.”
For the past 50 years, the Lebanese have overcome wars, terrorism, security clashes, and Israeli aggressions, managing to rebuild their homes, secure their livelihoods and raise their children. They have endured all types of crises, up until the most recent monetary and financial strains, all while suffering from a political class that has been feeding off State spoils for decades. 
As greater corruption lies among the most crucial challenges, it seems the capacity of the Lebanese resilience has reached a breaking limit. 

Read the rest of the paper on this link

Les Libanais se sentent trahis par la classe dirigeante - L'Orient Le Jour 19 octobre 2019

Two Tales for Petro-Lebanon: Stagnation in the “Middle Ages” or Quantum Leap towards Modernity

Dr. Karim El Mufti

Political Scientist

Social Entrepreneur

9 October 2012 

As the number of reports on the new oil and gas wealth Lebanon holds in its sea is on the rise – understand between 40 and 100 billion dollars worth of reserves, depending on the estimates[1] – it does not seem like the current Lebanese political groups are giving this piece of information the attention it deserves.

Recently, Prime Minister Najib Mikati has put much of his international networking skills fetching not only aid for the tens of thousands of Syrian displaced on Lebanese soil (during the latest UN Summit in New York), but for the cost of ammunition for the Lebanese army[2]. In recent tweets[3], M. Mikati promised not to raise the issue of public wage hike to the Council of Ministers before the Treasury could find a way to finance it (about 1.2 billion dollars), showing a chronic lack of imagination for diversifying the State revenues (the “Mikati Floor”, raising the VAT rate), just as if the newly established resources do not exist.

More preoccupying is the inability of the government to name the members of the Board of the new Petroleum Administration, the body in charge of managing the process that would supervise the drilling offshore, not to mention the need to adopt a law on the oil sovereign fund and to issue the executive decrees pertaining to oil and gas regulations.

As Lebanese different political factions are triggering their electoral campaigns, there is no mention, let again a vision, of a financial strategy of how to use these newly discovered resources (that can in theory be accessible within 6 to 10 years, and this is tomorrow[4]) for the sake of the economic welfare of the country and its population.  Only Minister Bassil, in his capacity of Minister of Power and Hydraulic Resources showed eagerness to use the newly found gas to help solve the electricity crisis in Lebanon[5], but this is as far as his political platform has to offer on this issue.

Yet, the wealth potential of Lebanon is not without consequences at the level of the country’s political economy. Taking the “Corruption turn” and it is stagnation in the Middle Ages era – the country is still enduring 20 years after the end of the civil war – that awaits[6]. Last September 2011, LCPS Director Sami Atallah already warned that this matter “has the potential to greatly undermine Lebanon’s economic and political system should gas revenues be mismanaged”[7]. Pressure and momentum should be optimized without any additional delay to secure an alternative tale for Lebanon’s economic future that would give the necessary means and tools for a true modernization process nationwide.  

Three national economic priorities – at least – can be identified at this stage.

First, reducing Lebanon’s National Debt that is dangerously increasing year after year, reaching today 55.27 billion dollars[8]. This has put a lot of pressure on the ability of the Treasury to finance itself through international credit mechanisms and has doomed any chance of a financial independence for the country. With billions of dollars of extra revenues each year thanks to oil and gas, Lebanon holds the power to renegotiate its internal and external debts (while erasing some parts of it). Above all, the newly acquired status of oil and gas exporter would render easier access to financial markets with a better grading (today a mediocre “B1” according to Moody’s ; “BB” for Standard & Poor’s) and lower interest rates. This would provide greater visibility for the Lebanese authorities in the future in dealing with public finance, maybe even favor the lowering of specific taxes and encouraging both investment and consumption.

Second, Lebanon is in great need of investing and modernizing its urban greater infrastructure. From its scattered urban tissue in the capital Beirut to the marginalized urban areas of the rest of the country, there is a real urge in reshaping the urban structure. By redesigning towns, providing cheaper electricity and telecoms, connecting households to gas and water, upgrading the sewage system, dealing with solid waste, integrating the necessary road, rail, port, aerial and ferry infrastructure that would support passenger commuting and merchandise transportation, Lebanon would finally cross the modernity line. This investment plan, implemented through public-private partnerships and other public management tools, would enhance job creation and increase Lebanon’s GDP by at least 5 points, and more importantly, drastically improve the population’s well being. Furthermore, the State would be able to afford constructing public buildings instead of wasting 500 million dollars in rent each year for the offices of its various ministries and public institutions.

Thirdly, the newly established wealth should be used to strengthen social and health programs nationwide. The National Social Security Funds (NSSF) is chronically indebted[9] and proved catastrophic management, rendering social and health benefits hazardous for low-income households. Modernizing the NSSF, financing public hospitals, generalizing access to health and improving social programs (such as the war handicapped whose fate fall under the national responsibility of the ruling war lords or, for instance, caring for street children), would prove essential for the well being of the population.

As Lebanon enters a new round of electoral confrontation, a special focus should be given to the means of accessing greater wealth for the State which should gain a rapid national consensus, rather than sterile cleavages over regional choices that don’t even depend on the will of the local war lords. The issue of modernizing Lebanon has been pending for the past 40 years; needless to say it must be addressed immediately by the competing political groups, at least through a national debate with all stakeholders and civil society on the strategic implications of this new component of Lebanese richness that would open a window of opportunity for a much needed “quantum leap”.  This debate is now open...

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[1] Britain-based Geo Ltd. Spectrum Company made an initial assessment of the 3,000 square kilometres indicating there may be 25 trillion cubic feet of gas in the entire zone, source, estimating it is worth $40 billion, The Daily Star, 25 September 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Lebanon/2012/Sep-25/189115-bassil-one-gas-well-provides-99-years-electricity.ashx#ixzz28jVzSTiv. Roudi Baroudi, secretary-general of World Energy Council, pointed out that Lebanon’s oil and gas wealth is much larger than what was unveiled by Spectrum: “We estimate that Lebanon’s offshore can produce up to 90,000 barrels of oil per day over the next 20 years, with the market value of this output is around $100 billion”, The Daily Star, 22 September 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Sep-22/188868-experts-estimate-$40-bln-gas-reserves-off-lebanese-coast.ashx#ixzz28jWvJFwV

[2] The Daily Star, 4 October 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Oct-04/190099-mikati-seeks-funds-abroad-to-cover-army-plan.ashx

[3] On his account @Najib_Mikati, 3 October 2012, 4.53am

[4] Before reaching the production phase, oil and gas operations go through four stages starting with reconnaissance, exploration (three to five years), appraisal, (one to two years) and development (two to three years), in The Daily Star, 25 September 2012, op. cit.

[5] Bassil: One gas well provides 99 years electricity, The Daily Star, 25 September 2012, op. cit.

[6] During the period 1991-2006, Lebanon has spent 7.24 billion dollars on its infrastructure reconstruction and consolidation projects, with the poor results we see today. Source: Council for Reconstruction and Development, available on www.cdr.gov.lb/french/progress_reports/pr072007/index.asp

[7] Managing Lebanon’s Gas: Pursuing a Pipe Dream? Al Akhbar English Edition, 15 September 2011, available at http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/managing-lebanon%E2%80%99s-gas-pursuing-pipe-dream

[8] A 3% increase compared to end of 2011, figure for the end of second quarter of 2012, source: Quarterly Bulletin of the Ministry of Finance, Issue No. 21, Quarter II 2012, available at http://www.finance.gov.lb/en-US/finance/PublicDebt/Documents/Quarterly%20Debt%20Report/2012/Debt%20and%20Debt%20Markets%20QII%202012.pdf

[9] Approximately 3 billion dollars, source: Byblos Bank Economic Analysis, Issue 258, April 2-7 2012, available at http://www.byblosbank.com/Library/Files/Lebanon/Publications/Economic%20Research/Lebanon%20This%20Week/LTW_258.pdf

Lebanon Downhill, a Mafiocracy in Action

Dr. Karim El Mufti

University teacher 

Social entrepreneur

We need not talk about corruption in Lebanon anymore[1], its Greater Corruption that has taken over the land of the Cedars. More than 20 years after the end of the civil war and dozens of billions of dollars swollen up by the “costs” of reconstruction and rehabilitation, Lebanon’s situation remains as if the conflict just ended. As such, the current economic and social status appears to have worsened lately, as the infrastructure experienced serious degradation, coming close to collapsing: sharp power blackouts[2], mobile network failures, internet connection close to being the slowest in the world[3], absence of sustainable commuting system[4], ravaging pollution[5], rotten food[6], fake medicine[7], expanding chaotic urbanization and building structural failures[8], destruction of ancient heritage[9], not to mention that Beirut recently won the palm of the most expensive city in the region[10].

The list goes on and on, putting the future of the country’s economic and social welfare at great risk, not to mention the regression of human rights in what used to be the most progressive Arab country as far as freedom of expression is concerned[11]. The heavy militarization of policy making, which paramount represents the preoccupying new political custom of electing a military commander as head of State, along with the growing discretionary role of the General Security and other security agencies, also send worrying signals as to where Lebanon is headed. Not willing to tackle urgent socio-economic issues, the entirety of the political class strategically relies on the security grip (each allied with a particular security sector) to continue to impose the stability of a deeply corrupted system.

This Greater Corruption has not only put a halt to the modernization of the country, but has also established a very narrow profiting system in which members of the political elite substantially feed from the different lucrative sectors in our national economy, whether in public or private sector, thus handing over the country’s (un)management to the hands of a mafiocracy. Monopolies have restricted a big portion of the country’s wealth in the hands of a few ; unregulated banks are no match to the rising challenge of financing growth and modern sectors of economic activity ; the oil and gas reserves still await maritime exploitation ; consumers rights are left by the door not allowed any place in the system. Public land is either leased to the private sector for symbolic dollars[12], or partially privatized[13] or closed down for any public community to share[14]. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) struggle to keep up with the heightening costs of doing business due to the lack of investments in proper infrastructure, causing heavy inflation of the costs of living for the Lebanese population.

In order for this mafiocracy to maintain its tight grip over Lebanon, three factors are in place. First, the absence of the notion of conflict of interest that lost all legal and cultural significance in both the public/private landscapes at all levels of the society[15]. Second, the protection umbrella granted by political and security actors tying up the hands of the judiciary and any law enforcement attempt. Thirdly, the continuous choice of policymakers to escape any reshuffling of the fiscal and financial burden in a fair and responsible manner and continue to rely on two major funding channels; for the State, dependency on foreign aid worth billions of dollars; for the Lebanese households, dependency on the expatriates’ yearly eight billion dollars sent to their families.

The effects of Greater Corruption led the social elevator to dramatically slow down, as educated youth flee a shallow job market and real estate costs suffocate young families now indebted for 20 or 30 years. As a result, grave consequences are starting to surface; the recent hike in the number of bank robberies, cases of breaking and entering, carjacking, looting and kidnapping (despite the “security enforcement month” recently launched by Interior Minister Marwan Charbel[16]), represent only the tip of the iceberg. Add to that the hard strike launched by EDL workers calling for an improvement of their working conditions, practically ignored by relevant authorities, while other do-have in the country do not share the fiscal burden within the national economy.

This alarming situation doesn’t seem to worry the ruling political class who doesn’t appear keen to change the unwritten rules of the present political economical system, despite the fact that we are approaching key parliamentarian elections next summer. As a matter of fact, the partial election in Koura held on 15 July 2012[17] shows how socio-economic factors are completely absent from the political formations’ agendas. According to Ahmad Hariri, Secretary General of the Future Movement, this partial election is a “prelude of the 2013 elections which will determine the face of Lebanon in the future”[18]; no word (from either political sides) of the difficult living conditions in the local areas of the district.

The current mafiocracy is a collection of war makers, whether past or present. They have brought conflict, destruction, displacement and today, greater corruption to a point of social and economic depletion. As such, they represent the greatest menace for the future of the country. They are, forever, indebted towards the children of the civil war and the generations beyond.

15 July 2012

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[1] Transparency International ranks Lebanon as 134th out of 183 countries on their perceptions of corruption index, with a score of 2.5 out of 10, a level considered very corrupt. The country is perceived as the 13th most corrupt in the region, in The Daily Star, 14 June 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Jun-14/176776-corruption-remains-rampant-in-lebanon-transparency-organization-warns.ashx#ixzz20lHszvbL

[2] The latest power blackout was in June 2012, read http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Jun-19/177356-major-electricity-repairs-completed-following-lebanon-blackout.ashx#axzz20gJlIyn8

[3] “Lebanon has slowest Internet connection in the world”, Le Commerce du Levant, March 2011,

[4] Read “La Loi des Bulldozers”, L’Orient Le-Jour ,14 July 2012.

[5] Read “Air Pollution linked to Cancer in Lebanon”, The Daily Star, 28 July 2010.

[6] In March 2012, a food safety crisis was revealed as several tons of meat, chicken and fish were dumped throughout Lebanon by irresponsible restaurant owners, read http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Mar-08/165939-authorities-confiscate-rotten-meat-and-chicken.ashx#axzz20gJlIyn8

[7] Lebanon frequently has to deal with counterfeit drugs on the local market leading to many fatal consequences, read “Fake drugs are real threats”, Now Lebanon, 29 March 2010.

[8] On 15 January 2012, a building collapsed in Fassouh neighborhood of Beirut killing 27 people. Read http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Jan-16/159999-11-bodies-pulled-from-collapsed-beirut-building.ashx#axzz20gJlIyn8

[9] The latest episode of the destruction of Lebanese Heritage was the devastation by real estate promoters of ancient ruins on the Mina El Hosn protected site in Beirut on 26 June 2012, read http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=415856 

[10] Cf http://www.ameinfo.com/beirut-replaces-abu-dhabi-expensive-city-303508

[11] See the innovative civil society series Mamnou3/Forbidden, A Lebanese web-series about the day-to-day inner workings of the country's censorship bureau, www.mamnou3.com

[12] For instance, the Golf Club in Ouzai (South of Beirut), a select club established on a public lot, is rented by the State to a private holding for 1.100 Lebanese Pounds a year (0.73$), cf An Nahar, 6 April 2011. On another note, public coast land is rented to private beach resorts by State for 4.5$ per sqm, as disclosed by Al Akhbar on 2 July 2012, cf http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/96703

[13] Like the case of SOLIDERE, cf BEYHUM, Nabil. The Crisis of Urban Culture: The Three Reconstruction Plans for Beirut. The Beirut Review, n°4, Fall 1992

[14] Like the case of Horsh Beirut, the Pine Forest at the heart of Beirut closed to the public, cf “Beirut’s lone public park isn’t”, Los Angeles Times, 7 January 2011.

[15] On Lebanon’s contemporary pathology, read Samir Khalaf, Lebanon Adrift, Saqi Books, 2012

[16] Cf http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=412290

[17] Due to the passing away of district’s MP Farid Habib.

[18] Cf http://www.lebanonfiles.com/news/409701